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his EAP completes 23 years. We enclose a
renewal form and appreciate prompt
responses so there will be fewer reminders
to send in the winter 2013 issue. As some
readers know, we have decided to distribute EAP in
digital, open-source format available at the website
above and at the alternative website listed on the back
page. In this sense, EAP is now ―free,‖ though we
continue to have editing, printing, and distribution
expenses. We will continue to mail paper copies to
subscribers. We would appreciate that readers
continue to subscribe or donate.
Three of the four entries this issue discuss
―architectural phenomenology‖—its professional and
academic past as well as its scholarly future. One
major focus is architectural theorist Jorge OteroPailos’ 2010 Architecture’s Historical Turn, which
argues that architectural phenomenology played a
key role in establishing American Architecture programs as viable university units of scholarly research. EAP Editor David Seamon and French architectural historian Benoît Jacquet review OteroPailos‘ book. Seamon examines Otero-Pailos‘ claims
in regard to broader trends in architectural and environmental phenomenology, and Benoît places the
book in relation to French academic developments.
We also include architect Reza Shirazi’s essay
evaluating the present state of phenomenology and
architecture. Shirazi seeks to locate an accurate
description of current phenomenological research
and concludes that the most precise label is
―discourse‖—i.e., a mode of study and design
initiated mostly by individual researchers and
designers who share ―some common concerns and
intentions‖ and ―interpret the possibilities and results
of phenomenological investigation in a wide array of
ways, both conceptually and practically.‖
The last essay in this issue is educator John
Cameron’s ―eighth letter from Far South,‖ which
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considers attention as it relates to place—in this case,
Cameron‘s rural home on Tasmania‘s Bruny Island.
Below: Architect Jean Labutut’s sequence of pastel sketches
depicting the visual movement of ―The World and the Cathedral,‖ a water-and-light spectacle created for the ―Lagoon of
Nations‖ a fountain he designed for the 1939 New York
World’s Fair; from Otero-Pailos’ Architecture‘s Historical
Turn, p. 49—see pp. 3–10.
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Items of Interest

life‖ and emphasizes the lived space of body, house,
and ―free expression.‖ The sidebar, below, reproduces Otto‘s last-chapter summary of the ―modes of
human space‖ as he examines them in the book.

The 34th annual Humanities and Technology Association Conference will be held at Maryland‘s
Bowie State University, October 4–6, 2012. The
Humanities and Technology Association is an
interdisciplinary scholarly society examining the
impact of technology on human life from a broad
range of perspectives. gsochan@bowiestate.edu.

Modes of Human Space
Concerning the question of the relationship of man
[sic] with space or his attitude to space, in the course
of discussion various successive forms have emerged,
which are not mutually exclusive but rather overlap
each other and are possible in combination with each
other, and which one can thus designate as modifications of human spatiality. It therefore seems appropriate, in conclusion, to put them together once more
in a schematic simplification.
1. First there is a naïve trust in space, a childish
sense of shelter, which can then continue in later life
as a natural or thoughtless sense of shelter in one‘s
house and home. Here we are merged with our space,
directly incarnated in it.
2. Secondly there is a state of homelessness or
houselessness. Here space manifests itself in its uncanniness and strangeness. We feel lost in this space.
3. This results in, third, the task of reconstructing
security by building a house, as discussed in detail in
the third part of this book. Through this a sheltering
inner space is created, separated from the outside
world. Menacing space does not disappear as a result,
it is only pushed out of the centre and to the side.
4. But because every house created by humans
provides to be tangible (and because, further, menacing space still continues to lurk, hidden, even within
the house), a further final task arises to overcome
once more the withdrawal into a fixed housing and to
regain a final security in a space which is no longer
the individual space of the house, based on man, but
overall space in general.
We must therefore, beyond the rigid appearance
of an artificially created and always deceptive security, reach the other, open security in which naïve spatiality is reconstructed on a higher level. But to reach
this is not easy and demands from us the special effort of freeing ourselves from the deceptive security.

The conference, Experiencing Light 2012, will be
held November 12–13, 2012, in Eindhoven, the
Netherlands. The central focus is the relationship
between light and lighting design on human well
being. www.experiencinglight.nl.
The conference, Place and Displacement, will be
held at Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia,
November 21–23, 2012. www.communityidentity.com.au.
The conference, Time, Space, and Body, will be
held February 11–13, 2013, in Sydney, Australia.
www.inter-disciplinary.net/probing-the-boundaries/makingsense-of/time-space-and-the-body/call-for-presentations/.

The 15th annual conference of the Society for Phenomenology and Media (SPM) will be held in
2013.
Puebla,
México,
February
20–23,
www.wix.com/societyphenmedia/socphenmedia.

Bollnow’s Human Space
After much delay, the German philosopher Otto
Bollnow’s influential Human Space is finally
available in English translation published by
London‘s Hype Press. Originally released in
German as Mensch und Raum in 1963, this book is
a phenomenology of space as experienced, partly
through Bollnow‘s own observations and partly
through reference to other phenomenologists, including Bachelard, Eliade, Heidegger, MerleauPonty, Minkowski, and Straus.
The book‘s first chapter examines the experienced nature of space, and the second and third
chapters consider the lived dialectic between ―the
wide world‖ and ―the security of the house.‖ The
fourth chapter considers various experienced aspects of space, including night vs. day, moods of
space, and the spatiality of ―human coexistence.‖
The last chapter explores the ―spatiality of human

—Otto Bollnow, Human Space, pp. 285–86.
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―New uses for urban spaces traditionally considered banal and
devoid of culture.‖

Benoît Jacquet & Vincent Giraud, eds.,
2012. From the Things Themselves: Architecture and Phenomenology. Kyoto: Kyoto
Univ. Press; Seattle: Univ. of Wash. Press.

Hernan Casakin & Fátima Bernardo, eds.,
2012. The Role of Place Identity in the Perception, Understanding, and Design of Built
Environments. Bussum, The Netherlands:
Betham Publishers [e-book format].

The 21 chapters of this volume were presentations at the 2nd
Phenomenology and Architecture conference, held in Kyoto,
Japan, in 2010. Contributors include Ross Anderson, Karan
August, Jason Crow, Sylvain De Bleeckere, Hubert L. Dreyfus, Fujimori Terunobu, Phoebe Giannisi, Karsten Harries,
Lena Hopsch, Takashi Kakuni, Rachel McCann, Santiago de
Orduña, Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Fernando Quesada, Gilad
Ronnen, Adam Sharr, Kiyoshi Sey Takeyama, Dermott Walsh,
Joanna Wlaszyn, and Yue Zhuang.

Edited by environmental psychologists, this volume‘s 15
chapters emphasize ―the role played by place identity with
regard to architecture and the city.‖ Contributions include:
―Place Identity and Religion‖ (Shapa Mazumdar & Sanjoy
Mazumdar); ―Place Identity Principles and Cultural Metaphors
in a Mexican Environment‖ (Hernan Casakin & Esi Abbam
Elliot); ―Place and the Politics of Local Identity: Belonging
and Immigrant Settlement in American Suburbia‖ (Debra Lattanzi Shutika); ―Identity and Identification: The Role of Architectural Identity in a Globalised World‖ (Robert Adam);
―Wither Genius Loci? The City, Urban Fabric and Identity in
Perth, Western Australia‖ (Felicity Morel-Edniebrown); and
―Place, Place Identity, and Phenomenology‖ (David Seamon).

Eran Ben-Joseph, 2012. Rethinking a Lot:
The Design and Culture of Parking. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
This city planner asks if parking lots can be aesthetically
pleasing and environmentally and architecturally responsible.
He provides ―a visual history of this often ignored urban
space, introducing some of the many alternative and nonparking purposes that parking lots have served—from RV
campgrounds to stages for ―Shakespeare in the Parking Lot.‖
He argues that, with purposeful design, ―parking lots could be
significant public places, contributing as much to their communities as great boulevards, parks, or plazas.‖ The result:

Anat Geva, 2012. Frank Lloyd Wright’s Sacred Architecture: Faith, Form, and Building
Technology. NY: Routledge.
This architect examines Frank Lloyd Wright‘s religious architecture, of which there are more than 30 projects, ten of them
built. The author interprets these works around the three major
themes of nature, democracy and freedom, and holistic design.

Two Book Reviews
Jorge Otero-Pailos, 2010. Architecture’s Historical Turn: Phenomenology and the
Rise of the Postmodern. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Whither “Architectural Phenomenology”?
David Seamon
his architectural theorist‘s historiography of
theory in American departments of Architecture is a useful contribution and provocative challenge to phenomenological research dealing with architectural and environmental
concerns. Otero-Pailos delineates the academic rise
and fall of what he calls ―architectural phenomenology‖—a field of research and practice perhaps best

T

likened to current phenomenological writings on environmental and architectural embodiment, particularly its perceptual, sensuous, and motility dimensions (for example, work of architects Juhani Pallasmaa, Rachel McCann, and Thomas Thiis-Evensen,
none of whom are discussed in Otero-Pailos‘ book).
Nowhere in Architecture’s Historical Turn does
Otero-Pailos explicitly define ―architectural phenom-
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enology‖ (henceforth AP), though he associates it
with such descriptions as:















theory of ―critical regionalism‖ (and seemingly, because of his structuralist ties, at least partly out of
place in terms of any comprehensive phenomenological lineage).
In reviewing the careers of these four architectscholars, Otero-Pailos is not so much interested in
clarifying or extending the reader‘s understanding of
AP. Rather, drawing on the structuralist theory of
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, Otero-Pailos argues that these four men provided a platform, either
directly or indirectly, whereby AP undermined the
academic power of art historians, who until the
1950s, were the only academics with sufficient
scholarly weight and prestige to advance any ―theory
of architecture.‖ Otero-Pailos seeks to demonstrate
that his four architect-scholars, drawing on philosophical phenomenology loosely (and sometimes incorrectly, according to Otero-Pailos), wrestled from
the art historians the academic right to produce and
sanction architectural theory. This move, according
to Otero-Pailos, did much intentionally and unintentionally to facilitate both postmodernist design and
also the poststructuralism and social-constructivism
that dominate architectural theory today—much of it,
ironically, hostile to AP [1].

―authentic, original human experiences‖ (p. xi);
―the primacy of lived experience‖ (xii);
―an experiential source of intellectuality‖ (xiii);
―sensory experience as an essentialist, ahistorical, antitheoretical, irrational, and subjective flight from all scholarly
conventions‖ (xiv);
―experiencing… primordial form‖ (xiv);
―recognizable patterns of experiencing buildings‖ (xiv);
―the body and flesh as sites of borderline spiritualist and
mystic experiences‖ (xviii);
―a certain kind of experience, at once of the moment and
timeless‖ (xxiii);
―an elemental language of basic bodily experiences‖
(xxxii);
―the deeper prelinguistic experiential language that… was
the organizational principle of every building ever built‖
(xxxiii);
―a timeless sensual ‗language‘ of immediate experiences
that architects could intuit across the spans of time‖ (11);
―the direct experience of buildings‖ (11);
―direct experience as the historic content of buildings‖ (12);
―a bodily communion with architecture‖ (26).

Ostero-Pailos argues that AP played a major role
in establishing American Architecture departments as
viable university units of scholarly research (in addition to their more conventional role as centers for
professional architectural training). ―[T]here is no
mother tongue to architectural communication,‖ he
writes. ―Rather interpretations [in this case, AP]
function as seizures of power, as ways to gain cultural capital and to take up a position within politically
charged disciplinary multiplicities‖ (7).
To demonstrate the ―seizure of academic power‖
that AP provided American Architecture departments, Otero-Pailos devotes a chapter each to the academic careers of four ―architect-scholars‖ (10):
French-born architect Jean Labutut (1899–1986),
who founded the first American Architecture doctoral
program at Princeton in 1949; American architect
Charles Moore (1925–1993), who completed in
1957 one of Princeton‘s first Architecture doctoral
dissertations, which focused on a Gaston-Bachelardinspired ―Water and Architecture‖ (105); Norwegian
architectural theorist Christian Norberg-Schulz
(1926–2000), well known for his several books outlining a phenomenology of architecture and place;
and British-born New Left architectural theorist
Kenneth Frampton (b. 1930), most familiar for his

Dead or Alive?
Otero-Pailos is ambivalent about the current state of
AP. Twice, in different ways, he claims its demise. In
his chapter on Norberg-Schulz, he marks its death via
the 1987 publication of Chilean historian Victor Farias‘s Heidegger and Nazism, which concluded that
Heideggerian philosophy was inherently fascistic and
―dealt a final blow to architectural phenomenology,
which was already under the pressure of new poststructuralist approaches to the questions of history
and theory‖ (23). Later in the book, Otero-Pailos
points to a different moment of AP demise: the 1988
issue of the Pratt Journal of Architecture, which contained articles by both the AP ―old guard‖ (including
Dalibor Vesely, Paul Schneider, and John Lobell) as
well as younger anti-phenomenological theorists like
John Knesl, Hilde Heynen, and Mark Wigley, who
―began instituting a ‗nonfoundational‘ approach to
phenomenology, which prepared the ground for the
introduction of poststructuralist theory‖ (259) [2].
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If through these two moments of attack, OteroPailos seems to conclude that AP is dead, at other
points in the book he recognizes that it is still alive
but offers unclear reasons for mostly disregarding
this more recent work. For example, he explains the
absence in his text of architect and phenomenology
proponent Steven Holl because he and unnamed related ―others‖ are ―less concerned with questions of
historiography‖ (20), though what this explanation
for omission means, Otero-Pailos doesn‘t elaborate.
And in his epilogue, he grudgingly recognizes that
recent architect-scholars like Alberto Pérez-Gómez,
David Leatherbarrow, and Helen Powell have produced phenomenological work that helps build ―a
mantle of resistance to the poststructuralist revision
of architectural phenomenology‖ (259).
In other words, Otero-Pailos largely ignores the
well-documented production of current phenomenological thinking and research in architecture and allied disciplines. Instead, because of his Bourdieuian
historiographical framework, he is much more intent
on highlighting the broader professional and societal
failures and misfires of AP, which, if we accept
Otero-Pailos‘ claim, are benumbing in their range of
unintended consequences, including a return to a neomodernism that is the puppet of global capitalism:

tionable and in many ways unreasonable. In this
sense, Otero-Pailos‘ Bourdieuian historiography has
much less to do with ―an unprejudiced account of
[AP’s] history‖ (xv) and much more to do with an
arbitrary, selective effort to brand AP as the dominant but flawed conceptual vehicle via which American architectural programs gained academic and intellectual currency to the point where, in some programs, theory and ideology have come to impede,
and even cripple, design and practice.

A Valuable Addition
In spite of an incomplete historiography, OteroPailos‘ book is a valuable addition to the phenomenological literature on environmental and architectural
matters because it reviews some early innovative efforts to generate theories and designs that arose from
and sought to enhance human experience. The architectural and environmental works created by Labutut
to evoke a sense of participatory exhilaration and architectural sacredness through visual, acoustic, and
tactile encounter are fascinating, particularly as illustrated in the photographs that Otero-Pailos includes.
These works—for example, Labutut‘s 1,400-nozzle
fountain, ―Lagoon of Nations,‖ designed to create a
nightly spectacle for the 1939 New York World‘s
Fair—are an important but largely unknown example
of early design efforts seeking to widen and deepen
environmental experience [see sketches, p. 1].
Similarly, Charles Moore‘s work on Gaston
Bachelard and the experiential qualities of water
could be put to much more detailed phenomenological explication and extension as could NorbergSchulz‘s innovative efforts to use complementary
texts—writing, photographs, and drawings—to more
thoroughly evoke and understand genius loci and environmental ambience (an approach that Otero-Pailos
attacks as an ―instrumental misuse of Heidegger‖
[147] and a ―hypostatization of the invisible as the
origin of history‖ [161]). Otero-Pailos occasionally
points toward the creative, expansive possibilities of
these architect-scholars but, because of his focus on
institutional power structure, this work does not receive the empathetic attention a more purely-inspired
phenomenological interpretation would provide.
As someone who lived through the latter phase
of the first wave of phenomenology‘s infusion in the

[The] indecisiveness and inability [of architectural phenomenologists] to completely break with modernism produced unintended results after deconstruction, when we witness a neomodernist return to formalism and a turn away from the postmodernist concepts of history and theory. In the new neomodernist context, Frampton‘s figure of the master-mason became
the model for architects interested in controlling construction
costs through rapid prototyping and in eliminating the skilled
craftsmen that Frampton cared so much about. NorbergSchulz‘s ―spirit of place‖ was less a path to preserving ―rooted
building‖ than an expeditious aesthetic enabling multinational
corporate architecture firms to compete with local architects.
Moore‘s exaltation of the body as the path to intense communal
experience eased the transition to corporate architecture, which
catered to the culture of private exuberance and turned a blind
eye to public squalor in places like Dubai and Shanghai. Rooted
in a reaction to the collusion of secularism, capitalism, and aesthetic austerity, architectural phenomenology nevertheless
adapted premodern symbols to modern ends, eased the adjustment to new modes of production, and aided the transformation
of modern architectural practice into the bureaucratic administration of the built environment (23–24).

To hold AP responsible for these many aesthetic
and ideological blunders and misdirections is ques-
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architectural and environmental disciplines in the late
1970s and early 1980s, I would argue that AP as
Otero-Pailos presents it was actually part of a much
broader academic interest in phenomenology that
arose from the overwhelmingly palpable ethos of the
1960s that impacted almost everyone in the Western
world in one way or another, both professionally and
personally. Not only architects but also many geographers, psychologists, and other social scientists
called into question the positivist, reductive mindset
that at that time dominated the academy. Otero-Pailos
says nothing about the powerful ―environmentbehavior‖ movement that penetrated environmental
and design programs beginning in the early 1960s,
driven by the compelling work of Jane Jacobs, Edward Hall, Robert Sommer, Kevin Lynch, Oscar
Newman, and Christopher Alexander, to name a few.
Some of this research remained objectivist and
limited to the cognitive dimensions of architectural
and environmental behavior, but other scholars, especially geographers like Edward Relph, Yi-Fu Tuan,
and Anne Buttimer, rejected positivist science and
looked toward Continental traditions, including phenomenology. One important model was the empirical
phenomenological research conducted by psychologists at Pittsburgh‘s Duquesne University and promoted in four edited collections, Duquesne Studies in
Phenomenological Psychology, published by Duquesne University Press between 1971 and 1983. I
still remember vividly the pleasure and relief I felt as
a doctoral student when I discovered the series‘ first
volume because it provided a range of methodological possibilities for doing real-world, ―empirical‖
phenomenology. This work demonstrated convincingly that phenomenology need not only be done by
philosophers, a point about which Otero-Pailos seems
ambivalent, particularly in his harsh criticism of
Norberg-Schulz‘s interpretation of Heidegger.
Another important event relating to AP was the
founding in 1968 of the Environmental Design Research Association (EDRA), which provided a remarkable interdisciplinary exchange, with architects,
planners, and social scientists joining together in
common ground to better understand peoples‘ lived
relationship with buildings and places. The behavioral and experiential support and emphases of this
group eventually provided one institutional founda-

tion for more explicit phenomenological work dealing with environmental and architectural concerns,
including the 1990 founding of EAP, which was originally provided an organizational base by EDRA.

The Current Situation
I don‘t disagree with Otero-Pailos‘ conclusion that a
first phase of AP had wound down by the late 1980s
as deconstructivist, poststructural, feminist, and critical perspectives came to dominate theory, not only in
architecture but in philosophy, the social sciences,
and planning as well. But beneath the conceptual
hubbub of these relativist, power-grounded theories,
the much quieter voice of phenomenological research
continued to speak, especially through the writings of
phenomenological philosophers like Edward Casey,
Bruce Janz, Jeff Malpas, Robert Mugerauer, and Ingrid Leman Stefanovic, who all wrote book-length
studies of the phenomena of place, dwelling, and environmental embodiment and materiality.
Additional phenomenological force propelling
these topics was provided by architectural theorists
Juhani Pallasmaa and Thomas Thiis-Evensen; religious scholars Ronald Engel and Belden Lane; and
anthropologists Tim Ingold and Christopher Tilley.
Geographer Edward Relph‘s seminal 1976 Place and
Placelessness, the first phenomenology of place, was
reprinted, with a new introduction, in 2008; and philosopher Edward Casey‘s influential Getting Back
into Place was reprinted in an expanded version in
2009. Philosopher Otto Bollnow‘s classic Human
Space finally appeared in English translation in 2011.
The first international ―Architecture and Phenomenology‖ conference was held in Haifa, Israel, in
2007; and a second conference was held in Kyoto,
Japan, in 2009. All these accomplishments indicate
that ―architectural phenomenology‖ is alive and well.
For the most recent efforts in phenomenological
research, one useful impact of the much more dominant critical-theory perspectives has been their motivating phenomenologists to widen their recognition
of human experience. For example, the traditional
phenomenological emphases on rootedness, center,
home, dwelling, emplacement, stasis, and real places
(criticized by poststructuralists, as Otero-Pailos
points out [263, n. 12]), are being complemented with
work on peripheries, mobility, not-at-homeness, dis-
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Avant-Garde: Invocations of Phenomenology in Architectural
Discourse, 1945–1989.‖ One advisor for this thesis was MIT
architectural theorist Mark Jarzombek, whose 2001 The Psychologizing of Modernity: Art, Architecture, and History (Cambridge Univ. Press) is highly critical of how artists and architects drew on phenomenological and hermeneutic ideas. He
writes: ―Works by Heidegger and Gadamer were especially valued, especially once it was known that Gadamer claimed that we
can experience every work of art ‗immediately, without further
mediation‘. Once again, among artists and architects, the issue
was not so much what the European philosophers were really
trying to convey… but how to mine their work for quotes. This
is not to critique the aestheticness of the resultant theorizations
for being superficial (that presupposes a more correct way of
understanding, which I also reject) but rather to outline the reasons for its power…. Unfortunately, ‗phenomenology‘ and ‗existentialism‘ became little more than buzz words hiding perfectly conventional inspirationalist attitudes toward the aesthetic‖
(202). One finds the seeds of Otero-Pailos‘ historiographic approach in Jarzombek‘s definition of historiography as ―the site
of an intellectual functionalism that banishes unwanted realities
in the name of a clarified field of operation‖ (9).
2. In our first issue of EAP, we included a brief review of
this 1988 issue, recognizing that its poststructural essays were a
serious challenge to conventional phenomenological work (vol.
1 [1990], issue 1, pp. 6–8).

placement, placelessness, environmental dynamism,
virtual places, and so forth. In arguing against the social-constructivist criticism that phenomenological
research is essentialist, phenomenologists have
worked to probe specific human situations and lifeworlds, demonstrating the approach can deal as well
with human difference, hybridity, and alterity as it
can with human commonalities and lived foundational qualities. As witnessed by EAP entries, there is a
continuing interest in phenomenological method and
discoveries, especially among younger scholars who
have come to realize the muddled emptiness of much
of the social-constructivist and critical research.
Otero-Pailos provides some superb new material
on early practitioners of ―architectural phenomenology.‖ One must emphasize, however, that the historiography of AP delineated in his book is a partial
point of view. Environmental and architectural phenomenology remains robust. Its most important contributions to architectural theory and practice may yet
lie in the future.

Notes

Seamon is the Editor of Environmental and Architectural Phenomenology.

1. One assumes that Otero-Pailos‘ book arises from his
2001 MIT Architecture dissertation, ―Theorizing the Anti-

The State of Architectural Phenomenology
Benoît Jacquet

B

From the Things Themselves: Architecture and Phenomenology (Kyoto University Press/EFEO, 2012)
[see ―citations received,‖ p. 3].
The 2007 and 2009 ―Architecture and Phenomenology‖ conferences were organized before the publication of Otero-Pailos‘ Architecture’s Historical
Turn. In fact, we did not know of its publication
when we were preparing From the Things Themselves. The success of the two conferences and the
appearance of Otero-Pailos‘ book indicate that, for
architects (and for many artists too), phenomenology
is a major theoretical influence and that so-called
―architectural phenomenology‖ has a certain historical momentum.
Even if, however, phenomenology is currently
one of the leading conceptual trends in the field, it is
obviously not the only available theory. It has never

efore discussing Jorge Otero-Pailos‘ Architecture’s Historical Turn: Phenomenology
and the Rise of the Postmodern, I want to
explain briefly how I‘ve come to write this
review. After the first international conference, ―Architecture and Phenomenology,‖ held in 2007 at the
Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa, a second conference was organized in 2009 in Kyoto, Japan. For
that second conference, some 120 scholars submitted
papers. I was asked, as head of the Kyoto branch of
the Ecole Française d’Extrême-Orient (French
School of Asian Studies, or EFEO), to provide logistical support for the conference. After the event,
EFEO Kyoto produced an electronic version of the
proceedings (some 2000 pages!) that garnered much
attention, and we later decided to produce an edited
volume including 21 papers. This volume is entitled
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been nor will it ever be the only theoretical tool for
architects. In both the first and last chapters of his
book, Otero-Pailos suggests that phenomenology is
no longer the favored philosophy among architects
and has been usurped by more current ways of thinking. Nonetheless, in the early part of this decade, the
term ―phenomenology‖ still appears regularly in architectural book titles, albeit with a more ―classical‖
connotation. Indeed, the very last words of Architecture’s Historical Turn are ―we are not entirely free
from its grasp.‖
Phenomenology represents so many things for
architects today that it is difficult to define exactly
the meaning of ―architectural phenomenology,‖ or
even, ―phenomenology‖ itself. As pointed out at the
Kyoto conference by philosopher Hubert Dreyfus,
architectural historians have produced most of the
discourse on ―architecture and phenomenology,‖
providing many illuminating insights. But one may
also suggest that this architectural ―filter‖ has resulted in a certain distance from the original purpose of
phenomenology.
Jorge Otero-Pailos‘ book provides some explanation of this particular evolution of phenomenology in
architecture. I myself am an architectural historian
but, in editing the conference papers, I felt it important to collaborate with a trained philosopher, Vincent Giraud, who was a student of Jean-Luc Marion
at the Sorbonne, to return to the philosophical roots
of phenomenology. The purpose and contents of our
jointly edited From the Things Themselves have little
in common with Otero-Pailos‘ argument in his book,
but EAP Editor David Seamon invited me to do a review, partly because I have not been educated in the
United States and perhaps have a certain distance
from the American scene as described in Architecture’s Historical Turn.

and academic teachings, blazing a new path for the
architectural historian. We can thus imagine how Jean
Labatut, Charles Moore, Christian Norberg-Schulz,
but also Kenneth Frampton, have assimilated this
philosophical background to create a new profession,
that of ―architect scholar.‖
Otero-Pailos admirably renders how phenomenological language fits well with the architect‘s mind,
helping to bridge dualities that have plagued both
philosophy and the sciences since the classical period—for example, the gap between the sensible and
the intellectual. In its original form, phenomenology
discovered that the senses can precede reason, that
sensitivity can be applied to sensibility, that illusion
can also be a form of truth, and that practical experience can be a source of theoretical knowledge. Phenomenology offers a way to reconnect design to textual analysis and things to words.
In my opinion, phenomenology and, in particular, the phenomenological sources that have been
popular among architects, are far from representing a
non-intellectual, or even an anti-intellectual standpoint. Rejecting the intellect per se was never Husserl‘s intention. Similarly, Heidegger and Bachelard‘s
hermeneutical approaches, excavating the essence of
literature and poetry, are far from representing an anti-intellectual attitude. One of the reasons phenomenology is most attractive to architects is its power to
―gather‖—and even give ―intellectual‖ legitimacy
to—many aspects related to architecture and spatiality that are not apprehended by other philosophical or
professional perspectives. In this sense, phenomenology relates well to architects‘ ―interdisciplinary‖
minds and their desire to bring together sensitivity
and sensibility to the applied, real-world processes of
design and construction.

Interdisciplinarity

“Architect-Scholars”

David Seamon‘s review of Architecture’s Historical
Turn [see pp. 3–7] highlights the fact that, at some
points in his discussion, Otero-Pailos criticizes architectural phenomenology and its possible decline, or
―death.‖ This interpretation generates a certain
amount of ambivalence that can lead to extreme, entrenched views, something I hope to avoid here. I can
readily guess that, possibly for political reasons,
some people may be more inclined to pronounce the

I would say that Otero-Pailos‘ main thrust is demonstrating that phenomenology is an adequate medium
for bringing theoretical support to the teaching of architectural essence, for both designers and theorists,
including historians. Otero-Pailos demonstrates
amazingly well how architects have adopted phenomenological approaches to establish a certain type
of scholarship that tackles directly more conventional
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―death of phenomenology,‖ leaving the path open for
other forms of thinking. It is not my intention here,
however, to outline who may be in a position to take
advantage of phenomenology‘s potential demise (―à
qui profite le crime?‖). Instead, I would rather claim
that a phenomenological approach is compatible with
many other theoretical, intellectual, historical, and
social traditions. The writings of Heidegger, Sartre,
Merleau-Ponty, Bachelard, Derrida, and Ricoeur have
inspired architectural students for more than half a
century, but phenomenology has never been the only
way of thinking used by architects.
For instance, Nietzsche, the ―artist philosopher,‖
has been popular among architects as have philosophies allowing architects to imagine conceptual interpretations—for example, Deleuze and Guattari‘s
―thousand plateaux,‖ ―desiring machines,‖ ―rhizomes,‖ and ―fold‖; Foucault‘s ―heterotopia‖;
Barthes‘ ―mythology‖; and so forth. Architects do not
necessarily need to adhere to only one form of thinking and to only one school of philosophy. On the contrary, the process of creation requires a form of intellectual ―pottering‖—in reference to Levi-Strauss‘ notion of bricolage. Architectural concepts arise
through a complex process of thinking and intuition,
and architects can draw on whatever is available,
within hand-reach or mind-reach, to complete their
ideas and visions.
For example, in seminars I attended in the late
1990s at Paris‘ EHESS (École des hautes études en
sciences sociales), students were queuing to see Derrida, and Koolhaas was lecturing for free in front of
an audience of 50. In a logical, coherent way that was
far from surrealistic, philosopher and Orientalist Augustin Berque was dealing, in two hour segments,
with the thought of Plato, Leroi-Gourhan, Bergson,
Heidegger, Henri Lefebvre, and Japanese philosophers Nishida and Watsuji.
This environment was not just limited to one institute. In French schools of Architecture, the departments of History are not separate from those of Architectural Theory. Rather, they compose one sole
academic section of History and Architectural Theory. Historians work closely with sociologists, anthropologists, geographers, and linguists. For instance, I
remember that Jean-Louis Cohen would often refer to
various psychoanalytic concepts. He always encour-

aged students (at least myself) to explore and extend
philosophical interpretations. Jean-Louis also insisted
on the necessary use of images and photographs for
strengthening architectural discourse.

Back to Experiencing Things
Rather than focus on the possible decline of phenomenology among young architects, it may well be that
there is a larger issue involved—the seeming decline
of ―theory‖ within current architectural education. As
argued by Mark Jarzombek in ―The State of ‗Theory‘‖ (in L. King, ed., Architecture and Theory: Production and Reflection, Junius Verlag, 2009), ―Architecture‘s messy disciplinarity, which was the result of
the theory and history movements, is being cleaned
up, sanitized, and simplified.‖ The main issue is not
related to the fluctuation of ideologies—poststructuralism, feminism, neo-Marxism, postcolonialism—but due to the fact that, sometimes,
―thinking‖ loses some fundamental motivations. As
theorist Sanford Kwinter suggested in the 1990s,
technical modernity has created an environment that
is ―far from equilibrium‖ because, in many respects,
virtual worlds can become more exciting than actual
lifeworlds. The end of the city (and of architecture)
arrives when social networking, shopping, and playing in front of a computer screen become more interesting than going outside into the ―real‖ world.
In this regard, let me tentatively postulate some
possible solutions or avenues of thought. Perhaps we
ought to sometimes go back to the things that we
used to do, even be ―old-school‖: Re-read books; repractice handwriting and hand drawing; even daydream and re-experience ―boredom‖ as Bachelard
recommends in his Poetics of Space. More concretely, Otero-Pailos, who is also well known for his work
as an artist, describes what postwar architecthistorians brought to the classroom and even outside
the classroom. We learn that Jean Labatut painted on
his students‘ faces to teach them the experience of
camouflage (photograph, p. 27) and that Charles
Moore encouraged students to paint on buildings so
that architectural design was experienced ―as something immediate by removing the intermediary step
of technical drawing‖ (p. 127).
Immediate ―experience,‖ ―embodiment,‖ and
―tactility‖ can also be a form of ―architectural re-
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sistance‖ to technical modernity—a social and political engagement proving, as Kenneth Frampton‘s research shows, that architectural phenomenology does
not only deal with an elitist aesthetics.

enced may Architecture students, especially in the
1980s. For many, books like Genius Loci encapsulate
the core of ―architectural phenomenology.‖ I can
guess that this is also Otero-Pailos point of view,
since he states in the opening sentence of his book:
―When I entered Cornell University‘s undergraduate
architectural program in the 1980s, an older student
handed my classmates and me a copy of Christian
Norberg-Schulz‘s Genius Loci and told us to read it if
we wanted to get through school.‖
When I studied architecture in France in the
1990s, the first book I was advised to read was Le
Corbusier‘s Towards an Architecture; the first time I
heard of Norberg-Schulz, some years later, his discourse was then already considered to be ―out of
fashion,‖ although Sigfried Giedion‘s Space, Time
and Architecture was still a ―must read.‖ In most
French Architecture schools, modernists had more
power than post-modernists, and architectural theory
could easily refer to Heideggerian phenomenology
without ever referring to Norberg-Schulz‘s writings.
The renewal of ―architectural phenomenology‖—in particular, the reinterpretation of MerleauPonty by architects like Juhanni Pallasmaa and Steven Holl—indicates the polyvalence of phenomenology for architects. Architects also refer to Jean-Luc
Marion‘s notion of ―givenness,‖ to Anthony Steinbock‘s generative phenomenology, to David Leatherbarrow‘s architectural and phenomenal ―descriptions,‖ to David Seamon‘s environmental phenomenology, to Karsten Harries‘ environmental insights on
ethics, and to thinkers such as Dalibor Vesely, Alberto
Pérez-Gómez, Rachel McCann, Adam Sharr—just to
mention a few of many architect-scholars who draw
on phenomenological approaches.
Otero-Pailos‘ book is a milestone for the historiography of architectural phenomenology and reveals
what this discipline has accomplished and generated.
Moreover, the next generation has already emerged,
and is spreading over the world like a rhizome.

Intellectual History’s Past & Future
In his book, Otero-Pailos adopts a particular methodology that avoids mere historical periodicity, insisting
that ―the individual, and indeed the social, experiences of time‖ (p. 4) are redefining the term ―contemporary,‖ which ―[r]ather than a stable period of time …,
is an unstable category whose contents are constantly
changing in relation to the tensions and power relations between different generation of architects‖ (p.
6). Adopting what Seamon, in his review, labels as a
―Bourdieuian historiography,‖ Architecture’s Historical Turn is also a book of social and intellectual history, and I can see some similarities in its sociological
approach with, for instance, François Cusset‘s French
Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co.
Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States
(University of Minnesota Press, 2007).
Architecture’s Historical Turn shows the influence of European scholars (of continental philosophy) on American schools of Architecture. This comparison is obviously radical, and as such, OteroPailos‘ book is much more focused than French Theory. Otero-Pailos examines the fundamental thinking
and intellectual strategies of four generations of architect-scholars who have invented a genuine form of
teaching architecture. He explains how practicing architects have used phenomenology (and philosophy
in general) for finding an alternative to pure historical
studies, thus becoming leading architectural theorists.
Compared to the French academic system, we
can see that American graduate schools of Architecture have been very efficient in establishing doctoral
programs after World War II. In contrast, French
schools of Architecture did not have doctoral programs before the late 1990s. Even now, most French
architects get their doctorates outside graduate
schools of Architecture—from faculties of Letters,
departments of History, Geography, Urban Planning,
Liberal Arts, Sociology, Anthropology, and so forth.
Returning to the present and asking the future
state of phenomenology for architects, I cannot help
thinking that the work of Norberg-Schulz has influ-

Jacquet is a French architectural historian and Associate Professor of Japanese architecture at the Ecole
Française d‘Extrême-Orient in Paris. He is co-editor
of From the Things Themselves: Architecture and
Phenomenology, a collection of articles based on papers presented at the 2nd conference on ―Architecture
and Phenomenology‖ (see ―citations received,‖ p. 2).
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P

nomenologists? Can we call the phenomenological
approach to architecture a ―movement‖ in the same
way that we speak of modern architecture as a ―modernist movement‖? Are there common ―themes‖ and
―concerns‖ in architectural phenomenology? Or do
differences outweigh any commonalities?

henomenologist Herbert Spiegelberg (1982)
argued that there is neither a system or
school called ―phenomenology‖ nor is there
a definitive body of work that gives an exact
answer to the question, ―What is phenomenology?‖
He suggested that any claim of a unified phenomenological philosophy is an illusion: ―Phenomenologists
are much too individualistic in their habits to form an
organized ‗school‘‖ (p. xxvii).
This individuality is so strong, he claimed, that
―There are as many phenomenologists as there are
phenomenologies.‖ He suggested that ―It is certainly
true that, on closer inspection, the varieties exceed
the common features‖ (ibid.). He concluded that:

Architecture & Phenomenology
The lack of a common definition of ―phenomenology‖ is confirmed by many phenomenologists (Merleau-Ponty 1962; Moran and Mooney 2002; Moran,
2005). Whether defined as ―a return to the things
themselves‖ (Husserl), as ―a way of seeing‖
(Heidegger), or as ―the essence of perception‖ (Merleau-Ponty), phenomenological approaches have been
employed in both architectural theory and practice.
Moran (2000, p. 4) suggests that phenomenology is
more ―a practice rather than a system.‖ Probably because of this ―practical‖ character, phenomenology is
of interest to architects, who sense a concrete potential in its more philosophical conceptions and themes.
From the conceptual side, architectural theorists
claim that phenomenology might provide a true, reliable way of comprehending architecture. They argue
that phenomenology can locate the essence of things
and phenomena and thereby might bring us nearer to
existential being. These theorists have not only developed phenomenological approaches for interpreting architecture but—whether consciously or unconsciously—have sought various criteria to evaluate
architectural works, styles, and movements.

1. Phenomenology is a dynamic philosophy that advances in relation to intrinsic principles as well as
to the ―things‖ it studies—in other words, in relation to the typical territory it encounters;
2. Like a stream, phenomenology incorporates parallel currents, all related but by no means homogeneous or moving at the same speed;
3. These phenomenological currents have a common
point of departure but need not move toward the
same destination; rather, many of these currents
branch out in different directions that, collectively, can be considered as a ―phenomenological
movement‖ (ibid., pp. 1-2).
The question I ask here is whether Spiegelberg‘s
formulation of a ―movement‖ is appropriate for phenomenological work in architecture. Are architectural
phenomenologists as various as philosophical phe-
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ception and overcome the fundamental dilemma that
modern philosophy inherited from Descartes:

One such phenomenological theorist is Christian
Norberg-Schulz, who emphasizes that phenomenology is ―a method well suited to penetrate the world of
everyday existence‖ (Norberg-Schulz 2000, p. 15).
Drawing especially on Martin Heidegger, NorbergSchulz presents phenomenology as a ―method‖
whereby one might understand the world, including
the world of architecture.
As a second representative of phenomenological
theory in architecture, Juhani Pallasmaa presents
phenomenology as ―‗pure looking at‘ the phenomenon, or ‗viewing its essence‘‖ (Pallasmaa 1996, p.
450). He claims that, by means of a ―naïve seeing,‖
we are able to approach the ―essence of things unburdened by convention or intellectualized explanation‖
(Pallasmaa 2001, p. 21). In contrast, philosopher
Karsten Harries (1991, p. 12) is uncomfortable with a
classical understanding of phenomenology as a pure
and firm ground. Instead, he argues that, in regard to
dwelling and authentic thinking, phenomenological
investigation does not necessarily assume a strict goal
or unshakable foundation but, rather, provides a
―way‖ or journey through ―history‖ into the future.
Drawing on a perspective closer to Pallasmaa‘s,
architectural theorist Eduard Führ (1998) suggests
that phenomenology enables us to understand architecture ―as a part of our lifeworld‖ and thus brings us
nearer to architectural phenomena. In a similar way,
theorist David Seamon (2000) explains that the phenomenological aim is locating underlying commonalities that mark the essential core of the phenomenon:
―the phenomenologist pays attention to specific instances of the phenomenon with the hope that these
instances, in time, will point toward more general
qualities and characteristics that accurately describe
the essential nature of the phenomenon as it has presence and meaning in the concrete lives and experiences of human beings‖ (p. 159). He understands
phenomenology as a ―kindly seeing,‖ ―seeing with
new eyes‖ (Seamon 1993), and a ―revelatory seeing‖
(Seamon 2000) that allows for a ―careful description‖
of the phenomena (Seamon 2007).
In a broader philosophical vein, theorist Alberto
Pérez-Gómez argues that, in an era when architecture
has lost its metaphysical dimension and is no longer a
privileged form of people-world reconciliation, only
phenomenology can rediscover the primacy of per-

By revealing the limitations of mathematical reason, phenomenology has indicated that technological theory alone cannot
come to terms with the fundamental problems of architecture.
Contemporary architecture, disillusioned with rational utopias,
now strives to go beyond positivistic prejudices to find a new
metaphysical justification in the human world; its point of departure is once again the sphere of perception, the ultimate
origin of existential meaning (Pérez-Gómez 1983, p. 325).

One must also emphasize that phenomenology
has been an important groundstone for practicing architects involved with real-world design. Studying
architectural themes phenomenologically can enable
architects to think deeply about these themes and
evoke helpful images and details. One example is architect Steven Holl (1996, p. 11), who explains:
Phenomenology concerns the study of essences; architecture
has the potential to put essences back into existence. By weaving form, space, and light, architecture can elevate the experience of daily life through the various phenomena that emerge
from specific sites, programs, and architectures. On one level,
an idea-force drives architecture; on another, structure, material
space, color, light, and shadow intertwine in the fabrication of
architecture.

These theoretical and applied understandings of
phenomenology‘s value for architecture point to its
potential for clarifying thinking about buildings and
for facilitating design ideas. Though often quite different in their thematic emphases, these interpretations point toward the value of phenomenology as a
―way,‖ a ―method,‖ or an ―approach‖ by which architectural problems can be better identified and clarified. The suggestion is that phenomenology offers
one pathway toward a deeper, more comprehensive
understanding of architectural themes and problems.

The Situation Today
As Spiegelberg emphasized, phenomenology in philosophy is not understood as a sedimented dogma or
system. In this sense, there is no phenomenological
―school‖ or ―circle‖ in philosophy. But what about
phenomenology as it has been drawn upon in architecture? Should one speak of it as a school or a circle
or a movement or something else?
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of these efforts have become a significant movement
challenging the modernist legacy.
In the end, ―discourse‖ may be the best label to
describe the current state of phenomenology in architecture: a manner of investigation and design conducted mostly by individual researchers and designers who, sharing some common concerns and intentions, interpret the possibilities and results of phenomenological investigation in a wide array of ways,
both conceptually and practically. In this sense, we
can use the description ―phenomenological discourse
in architecture,‖ which can incorporate a broad spectrum of theoretical and practical discussions that
highlight such common architectural themes and
concerns as place, space, perception, movement, nature, lived body, and so forth.
As this range of thematic possibilities suggests,
phenomenological discourse is on-going and, in that
sense, a process rather than a product. At some future
time, phenomenological discourse may be able to
transform itself into a movement or a circle or even a
school. But that cannot occur until phenomenology in
architecture is better known, worked with, and formally organized. If this is to happen, there is required
an on-going effort to clarify current shortcomings and
to deepen longer-term possibilities. One need is a
critical reading that self-critically and creatively
evaluates the existing literature. In the last part of this
essay, I suggest some possible directions in which
this evaluative process might move.

We should not probably speak of a school of
phenomenology in architecture. ―School‖ points to a
group of affiliated persons who draw on a precise
doctrine, and this is not found in architecture because
of the variety of approaches and intentions pointed
out above. Nor can phenomenology in architecture be
considered a ―circle‖ in the sense that there is a less
formal group of thinkers sharing common perspectives, aims, and conclusions. It would be more accurate to argue that phenomenology in architecture arises more or less from common concerns of unaffiliated individuals rather than from a cooperative group
sharing collective aims intentionally translated into
specific actions.
One example is ―Questions of Perception, Phenomenology of Architecture,‖ a special 1994 issue of
Architecture and Urbanism, which presents some key
texts and projects linking phenomenology and architecture. Though this edited work points to some
common ground, contributors Pérez-Gómez, Pallasmaa, and Holl present their understanding of phenomenology in varying ways. In this sense, the volume offers no suggestion of a phenomenological
school or circle.
Nor is it probably correct to associate phenomenology in architecture with a ―movement.‖ Spiegelberg argues that, in philosophy, phenomenology is a
movement in the sense that participants share a clear
point of departure but move at different speeds in different directions toward different destinations (Spiegelberg, 1982). As with ―school‖ and ―circle,‖ however, ―movement‖ is not really applicable in architecture, partly because phenomenology has never gained
the strong influence that one sees in philosophy. At
this point, there are a number of independent figures
involved with architectural phenomenology, but their
number is not sufficient to be labeled as a movement.
To specify this point further, we can compare
phenomenology in architecture with the profession‘s
―modernist‖ movement, which is now powerful
enough to totally dominate contemporary architectural discourse and practice. Competing trends like postmodernism, high-tech, and deconstruction have not
been able to break free from the modernist vision. In
contrast, even though one can identify a considerable
body of work in architectural phenomenology, none

Major Trends
Most broadly, phenomenological discourse in architecture is grounded in two major figures: philosophers Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty
[1].While Heidegger‘s ideas on dwelling, place,
space, and being-in-the-world demonstrate the significance of ontological concerns for architecture, Merleau-Ponty‘s thought on perception, body, and the
sensible dimension of human experience provides an
important perspective on more practical, applied architectural issues. Christian Norberg-Schultz, for example, confirms explicitly that ―the philosophy of
Heidegger has been the catalyst‖ for his thinking on
architecture (Norberg-Schulz, 2000, p. 5), particular-
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ly Heidegger‘s interpretations of being, world, truth,
thing, fourfold, and dwelling.
In contrast, Juhani Pallasmaa is more endebted to
Merleau-Ponty, especially his attention to themes like
lived body, perception, and mobility. Pallasmaa
writes: ―Merleau-Ponty is free of the cultural conservatism I sense in Heidegger‘s perspective; the
Black Forest hut of Heidegger directs architecture
backwards, I think, whereas Merleau-Ponty points
my thought forward‖ (Pallasmaa, 2005, p. 18). Similarly, Steven Holl has been much influenced by Merleau-Ponty and claims that the philosopher played a
major role in fundamentally shifting his approach to
architectural design (Holl, 2000).
Other architectural phenomenologists highlight
the same philosophical influences. Karsten Harries
explains that ―Heidegger has presided over much of
my thinking, especially my thinking on architecture
and on space‖ [2]. As a geographer and environmentbehavior researcher, David Seamon utilizes phenomenological ideas as a means to examine environmental behavior and experience. He explains that

tentialism and stretches to the writings of Heidegger and Hannah Arendt (Frampton 1989, p. 79).

An Ongoing Tension
This brief sketch of the state of phenomenology in
architecture suggests that current efforts are best described as an ongoing discourse relating to human
being-in-the-world as it incorporates architectural,
spatial, environmental, and material dimensions. Borrowing from Karsten Harries, one might say that this
discourse oscillates between Fernweh and Heimweh—in other words, between a future grounded in
dreams of freedom and cosmopolitanism vs. a future
grounded in dreams of rootedness and home:
The opposition of Fernweh and Heimweh, centrifugal and centripetal longing, is constitutive of human being: in all of us a
longing to journey, literally and metaphorically, beyond what is
all too comfortable and familiar, challenges and is challenged by
nostalgia, a longing to finally settle down and call some place
home (Harries 2006, pp. 75-76).

In this sense, phenomenological discourse in architecture contributes to an ongoing tension: On one
hand, it stands for place, dwelling, and commonality
but, on the other hand, offers a constructive dialogue
with space, mobility, and otherness. This tension addresses one lived dimension of human experience
that can neither be resolved nor elided but respected
and understood through phenomenological discourse
in architecture:

The phenomenological perspective I represent is … a way of
phenomenology developed by such thinkers as Martin
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty that moves away from
phenomenological founder Edmund Husserl‘s focus on pure
intellectual consciousness (Seamon 2000, p. 158).

In this regard, Seamon‘s emphasis on lifeworld
(Seamon 1979, 2000) and belonging (Seamon, 1990)
are Heideggerean, but his focus on body-subject relates to Merleau-Ponty (Seamon, 2007). In his effort
to integrate phenomenological and architectural concerns, Alberto Pérez-Gómez draws on Heidegger and
hermeneuticist Hans-Georg Gadamer. One exception
to a common interest in Heidegger and MerleauPonty is architectural historian and theorist Kenneth
Frampton, who is deeply influenced by Heidegger,
who he supplements with the non-phenomenological
perspective of the Frankfurt School of philosophy.
Frampton writes:

It is in this need that both architecture and the architectural metaphors of philosophy have their origin. The antinomy that joins
place and space will not be resolved. Nor should it be resolved.
And architecture, too, should affirm and seek to embody it (Harries, 2006, p. 85).

Notes
1. Though not discussed here, the contributions of other philosophers like Gaston Bachelard (1964) and Otto Friedrich
Bollnow (1963/2011) are also significant.
2. In an email to the author, September 16, 2007.
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F

rom time to time at
Blackstone, I have
become
familiar
with different ways
of attending to the land [1].
Usually this attention has
been a background phenomenon, easily lost in the tumult of daily activity. Spraying thistles this season, however, I‘ve given much
thought to ―paying attention‖
in the context of Blackstone
placemaking and my past
involvement with spiritual
practices of mindfulness.
We had a wet, windy
spring this year. I saw thistles and other weeds poking
their prickly heads through
the grasses and knew it was time for spraying. But
each morning I‘d watch the scudding gusts of wind
across the d‘Entrecasteaux Channel, feel the sting of
driven rain on my cheek, and comment ruefully to
Vicki, ―I don‘t think it‘s a spray day today‖ [2].
One week in October we finally had a still, dry
day. I shouldered my 35-pound backpack of specialized thistle-spray solution and started up the hill toward the worst thistle infestation. I marked out my
first traverse, pumped up the tank, and set off. Backpack spraying is an odd physical experience. The
breathing filters on the facemask mean that each outbreath is accompanied by a rubbery, flapping noise,

making me acutely conscious
of the sound and force of my
breath.
Because the mask and
rubber gloves are designed to
keep out chemicals, they
cause my face and hands to
perspire. To keep the spray
from penetrating my walking
boots and trousers, I wear
knee-high Wellington boots,
which make hillside movement difficult. My physiotherapist advised that I wear
knee braces, since there is no
ankle or knee support in
―wellies.‖ These knee braces
impede my ability to bend or
flex my legs, and the heavy
backpack pulls on my shoulders and its liquid contents slosh about as I turn or
bend. I also wear tight back and wrist braces to support other weak parts of my 60-year-old body. The
combined effect creates a strange, constrained world
in which I am self-conscious of my breathing and my
sweating skin bound up in Velcro and rubber.

I

am making progress in discouraging thistles and
weeds and encouraging native grasses and trees,
but the consequence is that hand spraying has become trickier. No longer are there expanses of the
same thistle and little else. Now there are five species
of thistle and four common weeds dotted throughout
the resurgent grasses. Each intruder has a different
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habitat. The slender thistle (Carduus pycnocephalus)
tends to merge with the tall grass until I can spot the
pale purple flowering head, while capeweed (Arctotheca calendula) creeps along the ground between
grass stalks. If I keep my eye too much at ground
level, however, I can miss the rosettes of Scotch thistle (Onopordum acanthium), which are most visible
at mid-height.
When I spray, I systematically cover an area in
three-meter-wide traverses, which is the width of
ground that the tip of the spray gun covers in a sweep
from left to right. Keeping track of where I have just
sprayed is essential. Unfortunately, the only environmentally-friendly, water-soluble dye is deep blue, not
easily recognizable against dark green weeds and
thistles. As I carefully look for the blue, I must also
remember the tree, rock, or stake that marks the end
of the traverse.
The year before, my left shoulder had become so
painful from spraying that I consulted a physiotherapist, who noted I was hunching my shoulders forward
as if I were pushing myself to get across the slope
faster. ―Drop your shoulders back, keep your body
upright, stay relaxed and in touch with your mental
posture and attitude,‖ she advised. Easier said than
done! I didn‘t have the luxury of practicing bodymind scanning—thistles were in blossom everywhere
and required elimination before they set seed.
I was tottering across the slope equally weighed
down by backpack and mental injunctions (―Remember the tops of the grasses,‖ ―Don‘t forget the peripheral vision,‖ ―What are your shoulders doing?‖),
oblivious to the fact that it was a superb day to be out
in the fields. The pressure of imminently seeding
thistles couldn‘t become another burden to carry but
had to remain part of my awareness. I needed to keep
attention between thistles, markers, back and shoulders, and internal state of mind.
In mid-traverse, I stopped for breath. Standing in
waist-high grass and weeds, I realized I was near a
knoll where a few days before I had paused in the
wind. Encumbered in protective gear and support
braces, my head full of all the things I needed to keep
track of, I remembered that feeling of expansiveness
with a laugh, and suddenly it all seemed very familiar. My inability to keep relaxed attention on my
mind, body, and surroundings reminded me of how at

spiritual retreats I seemed to sometimes master the
multi-focused attention and mindfulness practices I
was taught but could never maintain them in daily
life once I was out of the environment in which they
were introduced [3].

I

was an active member of spiritual groups of various persuasions for decades. I‘ve received advanced teachings on training the mind and Buddhist philosophy from Tibetan lamas, spent hundreds
of hours in meditation learning mindfulness and visualization techniques. Before that for many years, I
was a member of a Gurdjieff group. In the inspirational environment of a long Buddhist retreat or in
the highly-charged daily meetings of a small Fourth
Way group, I had occasional moments of mental clarity, but they seldom lasted long.
In all these traditions, working with attention was
acentral to training the mind. To begin we focused on
an object of attention—the movement of breath or a
mandala—and kept returning to the object whenever
thoughts strayed. Then we moved to gently taking
one‘s attention off the particular object and onto the
quality of awareness itself. In theory, this effort led to
developing an all-encompassing attention that is continually aware of all outer and inner phenomena
without reacting to them. I can say, however, that I
never approached this state.
I thrived in retreats and group meetings, and I
was asked to do some teaching. But none of this directed work ever seemed to make a difference to how
I was in the everyday world or to my habitual reactions to situations. In retrospect, in Gurdjieffian
terms, I was a ―weak yogi‖—the person who ―has
insights and who can conceptually connect everything with everything… but when one looks at the
quality of their personal lives, they are just as dumb
and neurotic as all the rest of us, in spite of saying all
these incredibly wonderful insightful things‖ [4].
Throughout those years, I wrestled with what was
variously described as ―integrating the teachings‖ or
―the practice of daily life.‖ Training the mind should
lead to an enhanced, more malleable capacity to pay
attention, but in my case it did not. When I was meditating two or three hours a day after long retreats, I
would feel great clarity during the meditation and
visualization sessions. I sometimes felt more connected with the world afterward. At other times,
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however, it was as though I was in an invisible bubble separated from the everyday world and ―not quite
here.‖ Were my problems in the fields at Blackstone
part of the same difficulty?
As I pondered these matters, I was gradually able
to recognize the different weed species among the
grass more readily—what is commonly called ―getting your eye in.‖ It‘s not just ―seeing,‖ however. At a
field day in a local reserve, Bruny Island‘s residentexpert bird guide, Tonia Cochran, led us on a walk
into forty-spotted pardalote territory [5]. She listened
for the elusive birds as intently as she looked. When
she heard a soft double note that I could barely distinguish from other chirrups, peeps, and squawks, she
swung her binoculars and spotted the diminutive olive form of the pardalote from among the silvery
green eucalypt leaves. Clearly, you have to activate
your ear as well as your eye and get both working
together. As I thought about these well-honed skills
of the experienced ―birder,‖ I realized that I tended to
let the soundscape wash over me as an undifferentiated immersion experience. I rarely listened for particular clues about the life around me, the ―soundsigns‖ of their presence.

Archie‘s thistle-free paddock. She suggested I spray
them, but I thought, ―Oh God, I‘ve got my hands full
of thistle spraying. If I start worrying about every
weed on this place, I‘ll go crazy. I‘ll just let them
come and go and it will be all right.‖
A month later, Vicki mentioned them again as
more appeared. To humor her, I spent a morning
spraying, feeling slightly virtuous for heeding what
probably wasn‘t a big deal. Thereafter these weeds
disappeared from my mental consideration.
The following month I was out in the field when
Archie drove by in his Land Rover.
―You‘d better get after that dock that‘s spreading
through your fields.‖
―Oh,‖ I replied, pleased to have the weed identified by name. ―I‘ve sprayed it already, it should be
okay.‖
―I don‘t think so. You‘ve got a whole load of seed
about to drop. It‘s a nasty seed, too—triangular and it
spreads everywhere.‖ He was good enough not to say
that he didn‘t want all that seed washing down onto
his land, but the implication was clear.
Archie has been on Bruny Island for 40 years,
while I have been here for only six, so he has credibility. I walked over to the slope he had mentioned
and was staggered to see how much dock there was—
luxuriant auburn seed heads ready to burst. When I
reported this to Vicki, she wasn‘t impressed, considering the work I‘d have to put into collecting all the
seed heads, whereas if I had sprayed at her first mention, the plants wouldn‘t have gone to seed at all. We
agreed that for a man who has spent many years on
his meditation cushion, I can be remarkably unaware.
I had plenty of time to reflect as I began the arduous task of snipping off each of the thousands of seed
heads with secateurs and placing them in garbage
bags, taking care not to shake the seeds loose. Ruefully, I recalled the old saying, ―There‘s none so blind
as those who will not see.‖ Because I had resisted the
notion that there was yet another noxious plant to pay
heed to, I had not wanted to see the dock and so
didn‘t register that it was spreading in front of my
eyes. I chastised myself for spending too much effort
seeking to maintain the spacious quality of the occasional morning‘s meditation or thinking about the
subtleties of ―withness action‖ [7] rather than the

P

aying attention does not come naturally to me.
At primary school, one of my kinder nicknames was ―Absent-minded Professor‖ because of the thick glasses I wore from the age of three
and my tendency to have my mind on things other
than what was in front of me. I remember native
plantswoman Desley Kippax first suggesting to me
that I cut the seed heads off our native powa grasses
and scatter them on bare ground [6].
―When do they go to seed?‖ I asked, reaching for
my pocket notepad and pen to write it down.
―Oh, usually December or January, but you don‘t
need to worry about that—just keep an eye on them,
you‘ll know.‖
I didn‘t trust myself to know so wrote it down anyway as an aide memoire. The stalks of mature seeds
on the powa grass are obvious to me now, but at the
time I didn‘t have either the eye for them or the trust
that I ever would.
A significant part of the process is recognizing
self-imposed barriers to being more attentive. Over a
year ago, Vicki pointed out some young weeds above
the long grass in an area just above our neighbor
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more prosaic work of attending to what is physically
right in front of me [8].
The remnants of the
―bubble‖ I sometimes encountered after meditation
sessions were coming back
to haunt me. I was grasping
after that quality of simplicity that so easily dissipated
when meditation ended. Also I suspect I was still prone
to the subtle self-inflation
that was an undercurrent at
retreats, a sense of specialness in undertaking esoteric
practices for the benefit of
all sentient beings.

um‖ that moves beyond
reactive mechanisms and
distractions. He notes that
―attention is not mine. Its
source is surrounded by
mystery…. [O]ne needs to
be at the service of conscious attention; one prepares for its advent through
active stillness‖ [11].
How is attention to be
developed? In the discontinuity view, one must first
recognize the limitations of
ordinary attention and the
associated, false self. Second, as presented by Novak, the automatic processes of the false self are
starved by not reacting positively or negatively to the
objects of attention. For
Benoît, the key is to retain
awareness of one‘s purpose in any action, in all attentiveness. On the other hand, Segal writes more of the
process of deepening ordinary attention progressively
through such means as anchoring the attention in the
sensations of the body, ―providing it with a kind of
habitat‖ [12].

S

uch ruminations on
the relationship between meditation and
land stewardship sent me
back to the literature on attention, where I found two
contrasting emphases. In what I would call the ―discontinuity view,‖ held by most commentators, there
are two distinct kinds of mutually exclusive attention.
The first kind is called by Philip Novak ordinary attention, which is discursive, intermittent and passive:
―It is not a quality of mind we bring to experience,
but something that occurs to us as we become temporarily interested in some inner or outer phenomena‖
[9]. In contrast, commentators speak of contemplative
attention, which refers to sustained, active, nondiscursive attention often developed as part of rigorous spiritual discipline. In Hubert Benoît‘s view, ordinary attention is stuck on its object: ―I am lost,
identified with what I am doing without being aware
of why I am doing it, whereas in absolute attention
we are aware of what we are doing and why‖ [10].
A contrasting approach is the ―continuity view,‖
which de-emphasizes distinctions among attention
modes and instead understands attention as a comprehensive phenomenon that can lead to a deeper experience of reality. As William Segal explains,
―Through the simple act of attending, one initiates a
new alignment of forces…. [O]pening to the force of
attention evokes a sense of wholeness and equilibri-

B

ecause attention is such a diffuse notion, different emphases cannot be taken too far,
though they became quite relevant as I tried
to better attend to my daily life at Blackstone. For
example, in its practice of mindfulness, Buddhism
makes much of the distinction between ordinary mind
and what is sometimes described as ―absolute mind,‖
―big mind,‖ or ―nature of mind.‖ According to Buddhist master Sogyal Rinpoche, the nature of mind is
like the sky: ―a primordial, pure, pristine awareness
that is at once intelligent, cognizant, radiant and always awake‖ [13].
Some Buddhist literature on mindfulness and
spiritual enlightenment appears aligned with the continuity perspective on attention. For example, Stephen Batchelor notes that ―to stop and pay attention
to what is happening is one way of snapping out of
such fixations [the surge of habitual impulses and
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worries]. It is also a reasonable definition of meditation‖ [14]. He goes on to outline the process of deepening self-awareness that comes with slowly expanding attention to one‘s body sensations, feelings,
thoughts, and the surrounding world.
Similarly, the Gurdjieffian system of selftransformation aims at a balanced development of a
person‘s physical, emotional, and intellectual capacities. As Charles Tart explains, Gurdjieff‘s path is
primarily ―a matter of mindfulness in everyday life‖
[15]. Although the Gurdjieffian starting point is similar to Novak‘s view that ordinarily people are oblivious much of their waking life, there is emphasis on
direct attention to bodily sensations as a way of living
in the present moment rather than recapitulating past
events or fantasizing about the future. Tart is one of
the few researchers who has had extensive practical
experience in both Buddhism and the Gurdjieffian
system. He concludes that ―I personally find Gurdjieff‘s techniques for creating mindfulness in daily
life much more practical and successful than Buddhist ones‖ [16]. He points out that, though Buddhist
teachings emphasize mindfulness in daily life, not
just in meditation, they provide few practical techniques for actualizing meditative presence to everyday actions and situations.

tial thoughts of leisurely bicycle rides, tennis matches, and cricket games.
What actually happened was, because we were
living more remotely and self-sufficiently, we faced
far greater everyday demands that, if met with inattentiveness, led to painful consequences. In other
words, issues of spirituality and attentiveness have
much more often involved mundane needs and actions unfolding in the context of a deepening place
relationship. This situation raises questions about the
interaction between place and attention. Does the
process of re-inhabiting place necessarily require
closer attention to one‘s surrounds? Is there something about the very nature and structure of places
that transforms one‘s attention or one‘s ability to be
attentive?
Even at a mundane level, I‘ve noticed how our
house and its location—a small dwelling with a large
veranda 40 yards from the ocean shore—affects the
quality of my attention. After dinner and dish washing, I carry the saved rinse water out to the garden
around the house. Most times, being outside brings
me to my senses a bit, breaking through my rambling
thoughts or the world news on our wind-up radio.
Last night, my attention was focused by tree martins
shuffling about in their nests in the veranda roof and
a moonlight shaft piercing storm clouds and illuminating wet, silver trunks of white peppermint trees.
During the day, if I walk halfway down the path
to the shore, there‘s a bare, rocky point where my attention is drawn outward over the water and to the
salt taste of the wind. Down on the shore, my attention moves to the soundscape of Channel breezes and
waves. The final transition is into the water for a
brisk invigorating swim or snorkel. Floating motionless on my back, arms widespread, I feel fully immersed and present. Back on the shore, I notice my
entire skin tingling, and I feel renewed.
The morning I stopped in the midst of backpack
spraying points toward another aspect of the spectrum of attention. What was required of me that day
was very close to the Gurdjieffian exercises of sensing and self-remembering. Tart emphasizes the importance of ―simultaneously making the small effort
of will to keep your attention deliberately divided…
You never let all of your attention go into listening or
just into seeing, but keep it divided, just a little bit in

A

ccording to the literature, then, I needn‘t feel
too badly about my struggles with attention,
meditation, and daily life. The gap between
what Buddhists call the ―ultimate nature of mind‖
and the sad reality of mental habits is integral to human nature. A key implication of the discontinuity
view is that little can be done with the sort of rigid,
limited attention I experienced in the paddocks. Rather, this is the typical nature of ordinary mind. The
long process of ceasing to react to whatever phenomena I encounter and not identifying with success or
failure would be very difficult outside a spiritual tradition. Developing sustained contemplative attention
would be even more arduous.
In contrast, the continuity view emphasizes a persevering with ordinary attention, whereby bodily
awareness seems particularly central [17]. When we
first came to Bruny Island, we had envisaged that we
would establish a retreat here, with much more time
for spiritual practice than our previous home offered.
In retrospect, this was as misguided a hope as my ini-
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touch with your body sensations, the arms and legs,
looking actively, listening actively‖ [18].
To spray effectively and not strain my body, I
needed to keep my attention divided between several
different things, staying in touch with the sensations
in my shoulders and back, as well as keeping track of
where I was going on the traverse. The structure of
the paddocks and the distribution of weeds and grasses provided the ongoing opportunity to practice the
sort of multi-focused attention that had previously
eluded me. Unlike the artificiality of trying to maintain in ordinary life something developed in workshops or on retreat, this effort is practical and downto-earth. Once again, I learn the power of embracing
necessity [19].

this experience was a spontaneous response to light
flooding the shore rather than some formalized evening practice. Even if the hours and days spent in meditation or on retreat have not directly seemed to
strengthen daily awareness or contemplative attention, they have left me with an expressive vocabulary
and rhythmic chants that this place seems to draw
forth [21].
Attention plays a crucial role in the flux between
my external perceptions of the place and internal
states of mind, as I discovered in a very prosaic way
when backpack spraying. Charles Tart calls it a paradox—the more you become aware of your external
world and your physical body, the more aware you
become of your inner life [22]. His explanation is
simple: You don‘t get so caught up in your psychological reactions, fantasies, hopes, and fears if you
can keep some space from them by maintaining part
of your attention on your body and sensing the outside world.

B

lackstone has been an ongoing source of inspiration. Over the years, my Buddhist practice has changed from a rigidly regular group
schedule of meditation, mantra, and visualization to
an intermittent, essentialized practice on my own.
There have been occasions, sometimes on the shore
at first or last light, when a few lines of a daily prayer
come unbidden into my mind. One evening last
month, as the setting sun turned the rock pools into
burnished mirrors and filled the sandstone caves with
honeyed light, I was stopped in my tracks by the
stillness. Putting down the oysters just collected, I
felt weak-kneed and sat on a nearby mushroomshaped rock [20]. Spontaneously, I broke into a Buddhist chant. As my voice reverberated in the sandstone hollows and traversed the water, I felt I was
singing out a heartfelt thank you to the Channel‘s
rocks, waters, and mountains in gratitude for their
simply being there.
As the echoes receded and tears flowed, I felt to
be part of the ongoing processes of this place, doing
something as natural as the gull‘s mew or the waves‘
lapping. Just as the mushroom rock radiated its particular ―rock-ness‖ and Mount Wellington radiated its
particular ―mountain-ness,‖ so I sat there radiating
my own ―human-ness.‖ All three things had an interior aspect, and I felt a sense of spaciousness opening
up within me and beyond me.
It might seem odd that I broke into a Buddhist
chant, given everything I‘ve said about the difficulties of sustained practice. Maybe all I needed was to
sit quietly in the fading light. The difference is that

P

erhaps my situation runs deeper. In The Spell
of the Sensuous, philosopher David Abram describes a subtle dependence of so-called ―interior‖ mental phenomena on taken-for-granted aspects
of the ―exterior‖ world. He quotes Rilke: ―The inner—what is it? If not intensified sky.‖ This depiction
resonates strongly with the Buddhist conception of
the skylike nature of mind [23]. In this sense, our
mental world is inextricably linked with the world in
which we find ourselves: ―each terrain seems to have
its own particular intelligence, the unique vernacular
of soil and leaf and sky. Each place has its own mind,
its own psyche… a place-specific intelligence shared
by all the humans that dwell therein, but also by all
beings who live and make their way in that
zone‖[24]. To evoke his own Pacific Northwest vernacular, Abram draws upon ―Douglas fir, red-tailed
hawk, serpentine in the sandstone, and fog offshore in
the summer.‖ Following Abram‘s lead, I offer my
first attempt at a Blackstone vernacular:
A sibilant wind in the casuarinas
Heron poised at Channel‘s edge in the mist
The briny seaweed tang of cool air at low tide
Wedge-tailed eagle, wingtip feathers fully extended, soaring
upslope
The wallaby‘s gaze, ears alert, above a tussock of powa grass
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In any event, I have already made key choices. I
no longer spend the recommended hours in meditation each day. I get out to the fields, learning practical
skills, trying to pay more attention to what I do and
what happens around me. The continuity view seems
to resonate more with my experience here, and I feel
ready to say that really paying attention is prayer—to
the indwelling spirit in all things and to deep listening
for the underlying language of this place. As Abram
explains, prayer springs from the practice of directly
addressing our animate surroundings, and there is the
same quality of respectful attention, whether one is
speaking to a divinity or to the sentient world [30].
Having said that, I find much in accordance with
the discontinuity view. Novak‘s depiction of ordinary
attention is an accurate account of the mental states I
commonly encounter, and Benoît‘s emphasis on remembering one‘s purpose in bringing attention to
everyday life is important to me. I‘m not doing it
simply to do a better job of backpack spraying. Rather, it‘s a way to help me wake up out from the deep
―sleep‖ of habitual action and to participate more
consciously in this place‘s unfolding life. Even this
effort can be tricky because, if one is not careful, remembering one‘s aim can lead to the psychic inflation of a supposedly higher purpose.

Mushroom-shaped rocks and the circular sandstone hollows
they leave
Scarred grasstree sentinels above the shore

In subsequent work, Abram contends that the instrument with which one enters the intelligence of a
place is not the rational intellect but the whole sensing body. One does not translate the local vernacular
into verbal language but, rather, attends closely to the
body‘s response to place: ―The body subtly blends
itself with every phenomenon it perceives‖ [25]. In
this way, one enters into mind-at-large—in other
words, mind not as a human possession but as ―a
power proper to every part of the elemental field‖
[26]. Qualities of thought and even particular
thoughts can spring from the landscape and creatures
that live there.
This way of viewing the mind sheds light on my
recent glimpse into the inner-ness of rock and mountain. Abram claims that our sense of a unique interior
mindscape to which each of us alone has access arises from the modernist destruction of the indigenous
view of the universe as an immense enclosure, a
―huge interior‖ that humanity inhabited. In the wake
of the Copernican revolution, Europeans found themselves on the outside, in space. Only then did the
modern idea of the mind as ―a wholly private interior‖ arise [27]. From this perspective, my propensity
for being outside is, paradoxically, a way of seeking
the inside of things [28].

I

‘m left with a new set of questions. How do I develop a robust practice of everyday bodily awareness out of the debris of exercises I have accumulated from years of spiritual practice, yoga, and physiotherapy? How can I discriminate between those
processes of mindfulness and visualization that promote attention to daily life, and those that perpetuate
the bubble of separation and specialness? What bearing does attending more closely to the local place
vernacular and my subtler bodily responses have on
our everyday place-making activities here? What
does it really mean to have one‘s awareness be part of
something so much larger—a place-specific intelligence shared by all the beings that inhabit Blackstone?
I head to the shore after a wild, windy day and
find myself in a place I don‘t usually go to—a small
rock shelf beneath a spreading casuarina. The Channel‘s whitecaps have subsided to a lazy slap and an
occasional reverberating shudder as a wave comes in
under the semi-submerged rock platform. The after-

R

elevant here is Simone Weil‘s claim that ―Attention taken to its highest degree is the same
thing as prayer. It presupposes faith and love.
Absolutely unmixed attention is prayer‖ [29]. Weil
contrasts attention, requiring an opening of one‘s
whole being in receptivity, with the work of will,
which only involves ―a few muscles.‖ After my convolutions over meditation, mindfulness, and different
types of attention, her words feel like a blessing.
Weil uses strong qualifiers when she writes about
attention: ―Taken to its highest degree‖ and ―absolutely unmixed attention‖ do not sound like the everyday attention necessary for washing the dishes or
spraying thistles. According to the discontinuity view,
these contrasting modes of attention are indeed two
different things, though Weil‘s terminology suggests
more a matter of degree than distinct type.
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noon sun has warmed the sandstone. Maybe I need to
relax more about this matter of attention and hold
these questions more lightly. It all seems to be pointing in the same direction—working with mental habit
patterns and embracing practical necessity. Embodied
mind. Emplaced mind. Attention. Remembering my
aim. Prayer.
The breeze sighs through the casuarinas. A wave
slaps the shore. Boom! The heron skims the water‘s
surface, silhouetted in the late sun.
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Western philosophical tradition, such as phenomenology and
Goethe‘s bildung, the schooling of the intuition and the senses,
which seem to be pointing in a similar direction (see ―Second‖
and ―Fifth Letter from Far South‖).
29. Simone Weil, ―Attention and Will,‖ in Gravity and
Grace (London: Routledge, 1952).
30. Abram, 2010, p. 170.

Notes
1. The very first encounter was seeing a heron poised on the
shoreline and the effect this sighting had when we first arrived
at Blackstone. See my ―First Letter from Far South.‖ This and
other
letters
are
available
at:
http://krex.kstate.edu/dspace/handle/2097/1522.

2. Spraying requires relatively calm, dry conditions so spray
remains on the thistles and isn‘t washed off the leaves.
3. My life partner Vicki and I have had many conversations
regarding our experiences of spiritual practice and paying attention. In 2009, we published a co-authored chapter exploring
some of these issues; see John Cameron and Victoria King,
―Spirit Place: Being Present in the Land,‖ in Spirituality, Mythopoesis and Learning (Brisbane: Post Pressed Press, 2009), pp.
197-205.
4. Charles Tart, Living the Mindful Life (Boston: Shambhala, 1994), p. 24. He describes the weak yogi as one who ―knows
everything and can do nothing.‖
5. As described in ―Seventh Letter from Far South,‖ the forty-spotted pardalote is a small endangered bird endemic to
Bruny Island.
6. Desley Kippax is an experienced native plantswoman
and friend– see ―Sixth Letter from Far South.‖.
7. Used by some commentators on Goethean science, this
term refers to action taken in partnership with other life forms
rather than doing things to them—see ―Fifth Letter from Far
South.‖
8. Neuroscientists term this situation ―inattention blindness,‖ which refers to the fact that the brain has a very limited
supply of attention. Focusing on one thing can make one oblivious to other things that would otherwise be obvious (see New
Scientist, vol. 20, December 27, 2008, pp. 43-45). This does not
imply, however, that nothing that can be done about a lack of
attention.
9. Philip Novak, ―The Practice of Attention,‖ Parabola,
vol. 15, No. 2 (1990), p. 8.
10. Hubert Benoît, ―Acceptance and Attention,‖ Parabola,
vol. 15, No. 2 (1990), p. 61.
11. William Segal, ―The Force of Attention,‖ Parabola,
vol. 15, No. 2 (1990), p. 77.
12. Segal, ibid.
13. Sogyal Rinpoche, The Tibetan Book of Living and Dying (NY: Random House, 1992), p. 47.
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